| ID | 147904 |
| Title Proper | Warlords, intervention, and state consolidation |
| Other Title Information | a typology of political orders in weak and failed states |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Malejacq, Romain |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Despite efforts to bolster failed states over the past two decades, many states in the international system still exhibit endemic weakness. External intervention often leads to political instability and in most cases fails to foster state consolidation, instead empowering and creating ties with the ones it aims to weaken. Using the case of Afghanistan, I develop a typology of political orders that explains variation in degrees of state consolidation and provides the basis for more systematic comparative analysis. I demonstrate the resilience of a political logic according to which non-state armed actors (warlords) “shape-shift” and constantly reinvent themselves to adapt to changing political environments. This article, based on extensive field research in Afghanistan, shows why failed states are unlikely to consolidate and exhibit Western-style state building, as a result of intervention or otherwise. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 25, No.1; Jan-Mar 2016: p.85-110 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 25 No 1 |
| Key Words | Intervention ; Warlords ; Failed States ; State Consolidation ; Typology of Political Orders |