| ID | 148177 |
| Title Proper | China’s intervention in the Korean war revisited |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kim, Donggil |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The outbreak of the Korean War and the announcement of dispatching the 7th fleet to the Taiwan Strait seriously shook the political and economic foundations of the newly established Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. Mao Zedong, taking advantage of North Korea’s ascendancy at the beginning of the war, wanted to dispatch troops to assist in a quick North Korean victory. That desire, however, was not realized due to opposition of Stalin.
With the landing of United Nation (UN) forces at Incheon in September 1950, China’s determination for intervention gradually weakened, informing Stalin and Kim Il-sung that it would not intervene even on being invited. Under a security threat and Stalin’s pressure, Mao decided on October 5 to send troops, but that decision was cancelled on October 12 due to Stalin’s refusal to provide air cover and weaponry promptly. On the following day, however, Mao again decided to send troops after Peng Dehuai argued that US forces should stop their northward advance at the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Securing the northern part of North Korea without bloodshed, thus extending China’s defensive line was a crucial factor in the final calculation. In conclusion, China’s Korean War intervention was made based on practical considerations, with maximum profit at minimum cost. |
| `In' analytical Note | Diplomatic History Vol. 40, No.5; Nov 2016: p.1002-1026 |
| Journal Source | Diplomatic History Vol: 40 No 5 |
| Key Words | China’s Intervention ; Korean War Revisited |