| ID | 150819 |
| Title Proper | Internal security duties and their impact on the army |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ahmed, Ali |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | India’s internal security commitment in the North East is well
over the half-century-long mark. In J&K, it has gone beyond a
quarter of a century. In both cases, it can reasonably be argued
that there have been periods of quietude in which the peace
process could have been progressed to see a viable termination
of respective insurgencies. In neither case has this apparently
been possible. A consequence of political inattention to conflict
resolution has been a continuing deployment of the army under
an unpopular law, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Acts
(AFSPA). It can be inferred that the belief underlying the status
quo is that the army can indefinitely sustain such deployment
and its effects.
Successive army chiefs have, usually while demitting office,
pointed out that this is an unsustainable belief. Internal security
duties have a long-term and deleterious effect on the army and,
therefore, they have urged political engagement in restoring
normalcy. However, the situation has remained largely unchanged.
There is even a danger of the army itself buying into the belief
that its deployment is indispensable to national integrity. An
argument could go that though there was some respite from
2004 onward in Kashmir, its disruption in 2008–2010 and more
recently this year, suggests that army deployment is inescapable.
Not all effects of such deployment are harmful, and those that
are can be mitigated by requisite leadership and training. The
army has sufficient depth in terms of numbers and moral resilience
to be able to sustain such deployment indefinitely – or so an
argument can go.
ALI AHMED
62 January 2017. Volume 20. Number 74. AAKROSH
This article argues that the assumption of the army’s ability
to sustain army deployment in a counter-insurgency role in
numerous states is fallacious. The army has to push back on the
internal argument that this is possible and to push on with
persuading the political leadership that democratic solutions
politically arrived at are the answer to the disaffection of people.
A lack of energy in a narrative along these lines is a pointer
that winning the argument for this internally will be probably
as difficult as selling it to the political class. The danger is in
the counter argument – of the army’s indispensability in militarily
propping up national integrity – making the army acquire a
stake in the disrupted security situation. It should not be that
institutional interests keep the army from a strong case arguing
for its return to barracks, where such distancing from an internal
security situation warrants it. |
| `In' analytical Note | Aakrosh Vol. 20, No.74; Jan 2017: p.61-70 |
| Journal Source | Aakrosh Vol: 20 No 74 |
| Key Words | Internal Security ; Counterinsurgency ; Political Leadership ; India ; AFSPA ; Northeast India |