| ID | 150865 |
| Title Proper | Peculiar economics of federal energy management |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Canes, Michael E |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | US federal agency energy managers face different constraints than do comparable private sector managers. They are faced with energy consumption goals mandated via legislation or directed via Presidential Executive Order that encourage if not compel them to invest more in energy efficiency or renewables than would be cost effective from a private sector perspective. To make such investments, they also are provided access to private capital that is additional to their agency budgets. The encouragement to invest beyond what is cost effective may be a source of waste in some instances, and the financing mechanisms appear more expensive than necessary. A rough estimate of the magnitude of the waste is offered, as well as a mechanism to reduce the costs of agency access to capital. |
| `In' analytical Note | Energy Policy Vol. 91, No.91; Apr 2016: p.268–272 |
| Journal Source | Energy Policy 2016-04 91, 91 |
| Key Words | Cost effectiveness ; Federal Energy Management ; Financing Mechanisms ; Wasted Resources |