Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:512Hits:20029876Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID151075
Title ProperLearning to deter
Other Title Informationdeterrence failure and success in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, 2006–16
LanguageENG
AuthorSobelman, Daniel
Summary / Abstract (Note)What are the sources of deterrence stability and under what conditions can weak actors deter stronger adversaries? To deter a superior adversary, the weak actor must convince it that if conflict breaks out, the weak actor would be capable of rendering its opponent's strategic capabilities tactical and its own tactical capabilities strategic. The deterrence relationship that has evolved between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah in the decade since—and as a result of—the 2006 Lebanon War (a.k.a. the Second Lebanon War or the July War) confirms this observation. A comparison of these two actors’ deterrence behavior in the years preceding the war and in its aftermath shows that one of the leading explanations for the ongoing stability along the Israeli-Lebanese border is that Israel and Hezbollah have learned to apply deterrence in a manner that meets the prerequisites of rational deterrence theory.
`In' analytical NoteInternational Security Vol. 41, No.3; Winter 2016-2017: p.151–196
Journal SourceInternational Security Vol: 41 No 3
Key WordsIsrael ;  Hezbollah ;  Deterrence Failure ;  Rational Deterrence Theor ;  Israel-Hezbollah Conflict - 2006-2016 ;  International Security Program ;  Israeli - Lebanese Border


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text