| ID | 151273 |
| Title Proper | Legal traditions and nonbinding commitments |
| Other Title Information | evidence from the United Nations' model commercial legislation |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Efrat, Asif |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Non–legally binding agreements provide an important tool for establishing international cooperation. We know little, however, about the variation in the implementation of such agreements. This article identifies a major cause of this variation: legal tradition. Nonbinding agreements, which may be adapted to local needs and circumstances, are consistent with the gradual, organic evolution of common law; by contrast, they are an uneasy fit with the civil-law tradition that neatly distinguishes between “law” and “nonlaw.” Consequently, common-law countries are more likely to implement nonbinding agreements than civil-law countries. Survival analysis of three nonbinding instruments—United Nations model laws aimed at harmonizing commercial legislation—finds strong support for this argument: common-law countries prove significantly more likely to implement these model laws. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 60, No.4; Dec 2016: p. 624-635 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 60 No 4 |
| Key Words | International Cooperation ; International Law ; United Nations ; Legal Traditions ; Nonbinding Commitments ; Model Commercial Legislation |