| ID | 151281 |
| Title Proper | Ballots and blackmail |
| Other Title Information | coercive diplomacy and the democratic peace |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Poznansky, Michael ; Michael Poznansky Matt K. Scroggs ; Scroggs, Matt K |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Does the restraint that prevents pairs of democracies from fighting large-scale wars also prevent them from coercing one another? While scholars have long drawn a bright line between using force and threatening it, the literature on democratic-peace theory overwhelmingly emphasizes the former. Using a dataset uniquely suited for the study of militarized compellent threats, we find that pairs of democracies are significantly less likely to engage in coercive diplomacy than are other types of regimes. We employ a variety of estimators to ensure the robustness of our results; the finding holds in all cases. We also elaborate on several alternative logics that might account for the hypotheses. This allows us to adjudicate between a variety of mechanisms. Our findings reveal that democratic-peace theory has broader applicability than even proponents give it credit for: not only are democracies less likely to fight wars with one another, but they also prove less likely to threaten each other with force. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 60, No.4; Dec 2016: p.731-741 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 60 No 4 |
| Key Words | Democratic Peace ; Coercive Diplomacy ; Interstate Conflict And Cooperation ; Ballots and Blackmail |