| ID | 151420 |
| Title Proper | India’s Taliban dilemma |
| Other Title Information | to contain or to engage? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Paliwal, Avinash |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | India’s Afghanistan policy in the 1990s is termed a zero-sum game of influence with Pakistan. New Delhi’s aversion to the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime is considered a marker of this rivalry. This paper revisits India’s approach towards Afghanistan and examines if New Delhi was necessarily averse to engaging with pro-Pakistan political factions during 1990s. Based on fresh primary interviews with former Indian policymakers, media archives, and official reports, the paper shows that India engaged with and accommodated pro-Pakistan factions after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until 1996. The Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in September 1996 challenged India’s engage-with-all approach. Nonetheless, the decision to sever ties with the Taliban and to bolster anti-Taliban factions was highly debated in New Delhi. Many in India saw the Taliban as a militant Islamist force sponsored by Pakistan. For others, however, it was an ethno-nationalist movement representing Pashtun interests, and not necessarily under Islamabad’s control. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 40, No.1-2; Feb 2017: p.35-67 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 40 No 1-2 |
| Key Words | Taliban ; Afghanistan ; Proxy War ; India ; Foreign Policy |