| ID | 151445 |
| Title Proper | Autocratic mandate |
| Other Title Information | elections, legitimacy and regime stability in Singapore |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Morgenbesser, Lee |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper explains how authoritarian regimes employ flawed elections to obtain both short-term legitimacy and long-term stability. In conjunction with the use of co-optation and repression, it argues that ruling parties hold de jure competitive elections to claim what is termed autonomous legitimation. This denotes the feigning of conformity to the established rules of the constitution and the shared beliefs of citizens. Regardless of overall turnout and support, ruling parties exploit the normative and symbolic value of elections in order to establish moral grounds for compliance within a dominant-subordinate relationship. In support of this argument, the case of Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP) is analysed in historical and contemporary terms. Since 1959, the PAP has used precisely timed elections to extract one or more mandate types from citizens and, by extension, claim legitimacy. In particular, it has sort a mandate based on its response to an event, execution of a policy and/or collection of a reward. In the long run, autocratic stability has been achieved through a process of reciprocal reinforcement, which has combined autonomous legitimation with targeted co-optation and low intensity coercion. The paper concludes by addressing the generalisability of this finding for other authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia. |
| `In' analytical Note | Pacific Review Vol. 30, No.2; Mar 2017: p.205-231 |
| Journal Source | Pacific Review Vol: 30 No 2 |
| Key Words | Singapore ; Southeast Asia ; Elections ; Stability ; Legitimacy ; Authoritarianis |