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ID152916
Title ProperWould China go nuclear? assessing the risk of Chinese nuclear escalation in a conventional war with the United States
LanguageENG
AuthorTalmadge, Caitlin
Summary / Abstract (Note)Could a conventional war with the United States inadvertently prompt Chinese nuclear escalation? The military-technical threat that such a war would pose to China's retaliatory capability—combined with wartime perceptual dynamics that might cause China to view this threat in an especially pessimistic light—could lead to reasonable Chinese fears that the United States might be attempting conventional counterforce, or considering or preparing for nuclear counterforce. China might see several forms of limited nuclear escalation as its least-bad response to this sort of threat to its nuclear deterrent, notwithstanding the country's no-first-use policy. This finding, derived from a more general framework about the military-technical and perceptual drivers of potential nuclear escalation in response to conventional counterforce, has broader ramifications for U.S. policy and military strategy, and it illustrates recurring dilemmas that the United States may face in conventional wars with other nuclear-armed adversaries.
`In' analytical NoteInternational Security Vol. 41, No.4; Spring 2017: p.50-92
Journal SourceInternational Security Vol: 41 No 4
Key WordsNuclear ;  United States ;  China ;  Conventional War ;  Nuclear Escalation


 
 
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