| ID | 153326 |
| Title Proper | Shifting power, preventive logic, and the response of the target |
| Other Title Information | Germany, Russia, and the First World War |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Levy, Jack S ; Mulligan, William |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to Russia’s position in the Balkans, one that could not easily be reversed, even with Russia’s expected increase in relative military power. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 40, No.5; Aug 2017: p.731-769 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 40 No 5 |
| Key Words | First World War ; Preventive War ; Power Transition ; Status ; Rising States ; July Crisis ; Buying Time |