| ID | 153360 |
| Title Proper | Benefits of hindsight |
| Other Title Information | historical research and political accountability |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Freedman, Lawrence |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article draws largely on my experience as the Official Historian of the Falklands Campaign, and then as a member of the UK inquiry into the Iraq War. My aim is to explore the particular challenges faced when charged with holding ministers, officials and officers directly to account. Although I was solely responsible for the Falklands history, I was part of a team working on the Iraq Inquiry, led by Sir John Chilcot. Not only am I speaking for myself, but it is not my intention to offer revelations about the workings of the inquiry.1 In practice, the work was relatively straightforward. Despite pre-publication comments about the length of the report and the time it had taken to prepare, the reasons for this were apparent on publication. The panel stuck together despite irritating and at times intrusive media speculation; the report’s findings did not leak in advance; and any disagreements, which rarely touched on the broad thrust of the report, were always settled without fuss. Compared with other inquiries, we were not even that expensive. Academics and former mandarins come at a discount to lawyers. |
| `In' analytical Note | Survival : the IISS Quarterly Vol. 59, No.3; Jun-Jul 2017: p.93-110 |
| Journal Source | Survival Vol: 59 No 3 |
| Key Words | Iraq ; United Kingdom ; Risk Analysis ; Political Risk ; Aregentina ; Foreign Policy |