| ID | 153558 |
| Title Proper | Resolve, time, and risk |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kertzer, Joshua D |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why do some actors in international politics display remarkable persistence in wartime, while others “cut and run” at the first sign of trouble? I offer a behavioral theory of resolve, suggesting that variation in time and risk preferences can help explain why some actors display more resolve than others. I test the theory experimentally in the context of public opinion about military interventions. The results not only help explain why certain types of costs of war loom larger for certain types of actors but also shed light on some of the behavioral revolution's contributions more broadly. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Organization Vol. 71, No.S1; 2017: p.S109-S136 |
| Journal Source | International Organization Vol: 71 No S1 |
| Key Words | Public Opinion ; International Politics ; Military Interventions ; Wartime ; Behavioral Theory ; Behavioral Revolution |