| ID | 154815 |
| Title Proper | Enhancing political cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or |
| Other Title Information | How it learned to stop worrying and love the (tactical) bomb |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Moody, Simon J |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article argues that the perceived need by NATO to nurture political cohesion within the Alliance during the 1950s resulted in the adoption of strategic concepts that were out-of-step with the military environment in which it was operating. It maintains that the Alliance acquiesced to American leadership on nuclear issues which led to the development of tactical nuclear capabilities at the expense of conventional war-fighting capabilities for the defence of the European Central Front. This resulted in a strategic concept that enhanced political cohesion but was militarily unviable. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 40, No.6; Oct 2017: p.817-838 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 40 No 6 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Strategy ; NATO ; Deterrence ; Tactical Nuclear Weapons ; Alliance Politics |