| ID | 154860 |
| Title Proper | Cyber Pearl Harbor |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Wirtz, James J |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The article describes the incentives that would motivate an opponent to incorporate a surprise cyber attack into a conventional operation to defeat US deterrent strategies by presenting the United States with a fait accompli. In describing this ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor’, the article explores the organizational and intelligence constraints that make it difficult to respond to the prospect of a combined cyber surprise attack and conventional operation. The article suggests that a cyber surprise attack will not occur in a political or strategic vacuum. Instead, weak opponents will use it to achieve objectives that could not be attained if US and allied forces were fully alerted. |
| `In' analytical Note | Intelligence and National Security Vol. 32, No.6; Oct 2017: p.758-767 |
| Journal Source | Intelligence and National Security Vol: 32 No 6 |
| Key Words | Cyber Attack ; Cyber Pearl Harbor ; US Deterrent Strategies ; Conventional Pperation ; US and Allied Forces |