| ID | 155058 |
| Title Proper | MAD who wasn't there |
| Other Title Information | Soviet reactions to the late cold war nuclear balance |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Long, Austin ; Green, Brendan R |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What do nuclear weapons mean for the stability of the military balance? Mutually assured destruction (MAD) describes a stalemated balance of power where nuclear adversaries possess survivable retaliatory capabilities that ensure neither side can escape devastation in an all-out nuclear war. Moreover, the strong form of this empirical claim, which one might term “deep MAD,” is that mutual vulnerability is an inalterable and unchangeable condition. Drawing from recently declassified primary sources, we test several of deep MAD's premises and predictions on one of its foundational cases: Soviet nuclear policy during the second half of the Cold War. We find that Soviet leaders remained seriously concerned about the nuclear balance even in an allegedly deep-MAD environment where warheads numbered in the tens of thousands. Indeed, Soviet leaders were uncertain that they could indefinitely maintain a secure second strike despite strenuous efforts. The reason for these discrepancies, we argue, is that the nuclear balance is actually more malleable than commonly admitted. The possibility that MAD might one day be escaped meant that US attempts to manipulate the nuclear balance during the latter part of the Cold War could carry political weight, even while MAD was still possible. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 26, No.4; Oct-Dec 2017: p.606-641 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 26 No 4 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; MAD ; Soviet Reactions ; Late Cold War Nuclear Balance |