| ID | 155773 |
| Title Proper | Examining informal defence and security arrangements’ legalization |
| Other Title Information | Canada–US agreements, 1955–2005 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kimball, Anessa L |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article presents and examines a model of legalization on an original dataset of informal Canadian–US defence and security arrangements (DSA) formed between 1955 and 2005. Non-treaty arrangements permit US presidents to bypass Senate ratification, resulting in expediency and secrecy, both assets in defence and security relations. That withstanding, informal arrangements contain provisions responding to certain strategic problems. They detail aspects of legalization: delegation; obligations; and precision. Leaders select informal arrangements to incur fewer public commitments, but design them to ensure credibility. In that context, what factors shape informal DSA legalization? Propositions developed from delegation and rational institutionalist arguments identify the factors influencing informal DSA legalization. The Canada–US case is germane due to its “rules-based” nature and heterogeneity. An original dataset of the legal design of eighty-two bilateral DSA is introduced and analyzed. Results confirm cabinet shuffles and unified governments decrease DSA legalization while Democrat presidents and rising military threats increase it. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Journal Vol. 72, No.3; Sep 2017: p.380-400 |
| Journal Source | International Journal Vol: 72 No 3 |
| Key Words | Legalization ; Rational Institutional Design ; Poisson Model ; Defence and Security Cooperation ; US–Canada ; Delegation Theory |