| ID | 156086 |
| Title Proper | Conditional commitments |
| Other Title Information | why states use caveats to reserve their efforts in military coalition operations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Frost-Nielsen, Per Marius |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply reservations, or caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats rose to prominence in defense and policy circles with NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan. In the scholarly security literature, the term remains a buzzword for all types of reserved efforts by states in coalition warfare, but there are few theoretical accounts addressing caveats. This article contributes to the knowledge gap on caveats through a comparative case study of Denmark’s, the Netherlands’, and Norway’s contributions to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates that caveats can occur through three different causal pathways: compromises from domestic bargaining, handling of alliance commitments, and implementation and civil–military relations. Insights into the complexity that causes caveats are highly relevant for both political and military decision-makers that are trying to coordinate states’ effort in coalition operations. |
| `In' analytical Note | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 38, No.3; Dec 2017: p.371-397 |
| Journal Source | Contemporary Security Policy Vol: 38 No 3 |
| Key Words | NATO ; Libya ; coalition warfare ; Rules of Engagement ; Caveat |