| ID | 156474 |
| Title Proper | Thought on North Korea's Nuclear doctrine |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kang, Choi ; Choi Kang and Kim Gibum ; Gibum, Kim |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | For Korean Peninsula watchers, the two most recent years have been tainted by
further North Korean provocations. Three nuclear tests and a series of missile tests
are signs that the North Korean nuclear crisis has reached a different level. While
talks have focused on deterring the use of nuclear weapons or destroying incoming
missiles using missile defense systems, relatively not much has been discussed
about North Korea’s nuclear strategy and doctrine. To make extended deterrence
against North Korea truly effective and fine-tune our counter–provocation strategy,
we need to think about how North Korea would use its nuclear weapons before
or during a war. One way to gain insight into its strategy is to examine its nuclear
doctrine. Whatever the initial purpose the North Korean leadership had in mind, it
has become clear that it is trying to build a second–strike capability, but whether
its nuclear doctrine is based on an “assured retaliation” or “asymmetric escalation”
strategy is to be watched carefully. North Korea’s reality indicates that an assured
retaliation strategy is more likely. But as its nuclear capability develops, it could aim
to adopt an asymmetric escalation strategy in the long-term. Before they accomplish
that goal, the ROK–U.S. alliance should find an effective means of changing North
Korea’s strategic thinking. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 29, No.4; Dec 2017: p.495－511 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 29 No 4 |
| Key Words | Military doctrine ; Nuclear Strategy ; Nuclear Deterrence ; North Korea ; Assured Retaliation ; Asymmetric Escalation ; Pre-Emptive Strike |