| ID | 156475 |
| Title Proper | Trump bets on the wrong horse |
| Other Title Information | outsourcing North Korea’s nuclear threat to China |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Chang, Parris |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arms, and the U.S. effort to stop it, date back to the
1990s. In mid-1994, the United States was ready to use force—to launch a surgical
strike with cruise missiles on the North Korean reprocessing facility at Yongbyon,
which produces plutonium–the material for the nuclear bomb. At the last minute,
North Korea’s leader Kim Il Sung invited former U.S. president Jimmy Carter to
Pyongyang to salvage the crisis. Thereafter, the United States and North Korean
officials met in Geneva and worked out a deal, the Agreed Framework, in December
1994, thereby Pyongyang agreed to suspend its plutonium program, while the
United States, the ROK and Japan would build two light-water reactors for North
Korea to generate electric power. The Americans find North Korean officials
skillful in deception and duplicity, which is rather difficult to deal with. In spite of
their public commitments, the North Koreans are determined to possess nuclear
arms and find ways to continue their quest. They also excel in brinkmanship—they
provoke and make trouble, and then extol concessions/rewards for cooperation.
President Donald Trump, much like his predecessors, erroneously believes that
China is willing and has the economic leverage and political influence to rein in
Pyongyang’s leadership. Hence, Trump has tried to “outsource” North Korea’s
nuclear threat to Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the wake of their summit meeting in
April. Trump has offered a better trade deal to China, but Xi has been reluctant–
to White House officials, Trump’s “bet” is not paying off. As the threat perception
of China and the United States is different, and the interest and agenda of the two
nations in the Asia–Pacific are also vastly different, Xi cannot be expected to do
Trump’s bidding on North Korea. Xi’s primary concern is to prevent U.S. military
attacks on North Korea that would result in the collapse of Kim Jong Un’s regime,
and a pro-U.S. government in North Korea. Nor does Xi want to implement heavy
sanctions on Pyongyang which could destabilize Kim’s regime and drive hundreds
of thousands of refugees into China. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 29, No.4; Dec 2017: p.513－531
|
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 29 No 4 |
| Key Words | Non-proliferation treaty ; Sunshine Policy ; Strategic Patience ; THAAD ; Agreed Framework 199 ; Six–Party Talks |