| ID | 156477 |
| Title Proper | Power asymmetry and the role of deterrence in the south china sea |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bowers, Ian |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | China’s coercive activities in the South China Sea have resulted in a lively
academic debate regarding strategies to deter Beijing and maintain the status quo.
However, much of this literature has been dominated by the U.S.–China dynamic
and has neglected the vital role of the littoral states in the region. This article,
through the lens of a maritime strategic environment, deals with the potential for the
littoral nations of the South China Sea to deter China. It argues that conventional
deterrence by denial is a difficult but applicable strategy despite the substantial
power asymmetry that exists between China and the littoral states in the region.
However, such a deterrent approach must be tailored to the specific, non-existential
challenges that China poses in the region. Among these challenges, this article
examines deterrence within the context of China’s claim to the Spratly Islands and
expansive claims to economic exploitation rights. A maritime strategic environment
provides multiple avenues to impose cost on a superior power and the littoral states
in the region have invested heavily in naval capabilities. However, as this article
finds, it remains to be seen if the littoral states in the region have the technical
capability or political will to successfully enact such a deterrent strategy. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 29, No.4; Dec 2017: p.551－573 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 29 No 4 |
| Key Words | Conventional deterrence ; Naval Strategy ; Maritime Security ; South China Sea ; Spratly Islands |