| ID | 156931 |
| Title Proper | occupier's dilemma |
| Other Title Information | problem collaborators |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hickman, John |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Every occupying power recruits collaborators but potential recruits vary with respect to their acceptance by occupied populations. That matters because the legitimacy of the occupation regime facilitates securing the war aims of the occupying power. This article surveys the different reasons why collaborators often elicit popular contempt, a response which may inspire insubordination and resistance, to produce a conceptual stencil of the optimal rather than the ideal collaborator. Limited pools of potential recruits mean that occupying powers may not be able to recruit ideal candidates. The resulting conceptual stencil can serve a checkoff list for evaluating the utility of potential collaborators. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol. 36, No.1-5; 2017: p.228-240 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol: 36 No 1-5 |
| Key Words | Occupier's Dilemma ; Problem Collaborators |