| ID | 157828 |
| Title Proper | Timing of third-party intervention in social conflict |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Chang, Yang-Ming ; Zhang, Yongjing |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper analyzes how the equilibrium outcome of social conflict between factions is strategically altered by third-party intervention. We consider an intervening third party that commits financial support to one of two contending factions for reducing its cost in conflict. Within the framework of three-player sequential-move games, we investigate the questions as follows. What is the optimal intervention intensity in terms of the third party’s financial support? Is there a first-mover advantage in conflict when there is third-party intervention? Fighting against all odds, will the unsupported faction have a chance to prevail when its opponent receives third-party support? What is the optimal timing of third-party intervention? The analysis in the paper has implications for the conditions under which the strategic intervention of a third party may or may not break a conflict between factions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 29, No.2; Mar 2018: p.91-110 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 29 No 2 |
| Key Words | Conflict ; Third-Party Intervention ; Sequential Game ; First-Mover Advantage |