| ID | 157849 |
| Title Proper | Bargaining with insurgencies in the shadow of infighting |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bapat, Navin A ; Rebecca H Best Navin A Bapat ; Best, Rebecca H |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Despite the long standing “no concessions” argument, scientific studies now suggest that governments can benefit from negotiating with militant insurgencies. However, despite government efforts, the leaders of insurgent movements often appear fanatical and unwilling to negotiate. This behavior presents a puzzle: If the leaders of insurgencies mobilize to create political change, and a government offers concessions, why do insurgent leaders refuse to negotiate? Using a game-theoretic model, we argue that insurgent leaders may rationally reject negotiation due to an internal commitment problem. Specifically, when leaders cannot credibly share the benefits of peace with their rivals, insurgent leaders may reject offers over fear of an internal conflict, which could leave the entire group vulnerable to government exploitation. However, the model demonstrates that insurgent leaders should negotiate if power in the insurgency is shifting in favor of their rivals, as it could help them maintain control of the movement. We illustrate these hypotheses using evidence from the Nigerian state's conflict with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) organization and Boko Haram. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Global security Studies Vol. 3, No.1; Jan 2018: p.23–37 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Global security Studies Vol: 3 No 1 |
| Key Words | Insurgency ; Negotiation ; Infighting |