| ID | 158410 |
| Title Proper | Advancing without attacking |
| Other Title Information | the strategic game around the use of force |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Altman, Dan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What is the nature of the strategic game that states play during crises? Extensive research examines the leading answer: coercive bargaining. States prevail by signaling resolve, establishing the credibility of their threats, and coercing their adversaries into backing down. However, instead of (or in addition to) traditional coercive bargaining, this article shows that states frequently play out a different game with its own set of rules and tactics. The article explores how states outmaneuver their adversaries: working around their red lines, taking gains by fait accompli and imposing pressure where it is possible to do so without quite crossing the line of unambiguously using force. Based on this premise, the article develops a theoretical framework for understanding strategic interaction during crises, referred to as advancing without attacking, and shows that it best explains the course of the Berlin Blockade Crisis of 1948–49 while also shedding light on other prominent crises. |
| `In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 27, No.1; Jan-Mar 2018: p.58-88 |
| Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 27 No 1 |
| Key Words | Use of force ; Strategic Game |