| ID | 158688 |
| Title Proper | Commercial diplomacy and political risk |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gertz, Geoffrey |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The modern investor-state arbitration regime was explicitly designed to replace commercial diplomacy as a mechanism for protecting foreign investment. I argue, however, that diplomacy continues to play an important role in managing political risk, particularly in countries with weak rule of law. Yet, since commercial diplomacy occurs primarily behind closed doors, it is difficult to observe, let alone test for its effects. To overcome this obstacle, I exploit variation in vacancies among US ambassadors to foreign countries—conditions overwhelmingly driven by US domestic political factors—which provides for a quasi-natural experiment for testing the effects of commercial diplomacy. I show that American firms operating abroad are significantly more likely to initiate investor-state arbitration disputes during temporary vacancies in US ambassadorships. The effects of these vacancies prove particularly strong in countries with weak rule of law. The results suggest American investors frequently seek assistance from the US government in informally resolving incipient investment disputes; if diplomatic channels are unsuccessful or unavailable, investors then file formal arbitration cases. These findings underline that, even in highly legalized issue areas in world politics, such as investment protection, informal diplomacy continues to influence important political economy outcomes. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 62, No.1; Mar 2018: p. 94–107 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 62 No 1 |
| Key Words | Political Risk ; Commercial Diplomacy |