| ID | 158692 |
| Title Proper | Rise predicts the fall |
| Other Title Information | how the method of leader entry affects the method of leader removal in dictatorships |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bell, Curtis ; Sudduth, Jun Koga ; Jun Koga Sudduth Curtis Bell |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How does the way a nondemocratic leader takes power affect the stability of their government? Prior research argues that irregular leader entries—those that violate the regime's norms for leader selection—are especially likely to foreshadow subsequent unconstitutional transitions. This article contends that some forms of irregular leader entry can actually protect leaders from subsequently being forcibly removed from office. When leaders use a strong and loyal coalition of supporters to overthrow not only their predecessors, but their entire ruling regimes, they demonstrate their strength to any potential rivals. Thus, leaders that gain power through, for example, successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime-changing coups, deter subsequent challenges. They are substantially less likely to be ousted than leaders who take power in ways—such as via normal succession or reshuffling among ruling elites—that do not convey strength so convincingly. We assess our claims by analyzing an original dataset of nondemocratic leader transitions. We show that accounting for the strength demonstrated during a leader's entry to power substantially improves our ability to predict how, and when, that leader will eventually leave office. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 62, No.1; Mar 2018: p.145–159 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 62 No 1 |
| Key Words | Leader Entry Affects ; Method of Leader Removal in Dictatorships |