| ID | 158850 |
| Title Proper | Institutional design of arms control agreements |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kreps, Sarah E |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The question of international cooperation on nuclear security presents states with a conundrum. While states are wary of the potential for cheating and opportunism that would favor more legalized agreements, highly legalized agreements also create the risk of being constrained in an agreement with which others might not comply, leaving one state vulnerable. How do states balance these competing incentives? Through the study of all arms control agreements concluded, negotiated, and seriously considered since 1945, this analysis finds that at least some aspects of the legalization parameters that would make commitments more credible and sustainable through the future—in particular obligation and to a lesser extent delegation—also make bargaining over the terms of cooperation more difficult, sometimes delaying if not altogether subverting that process. These findings have implications not just for how theories of institutional design and cooperation apply to nuclear issues but also for policies related to the conduct of arms control negotiations. |
| `In' analytical Note | Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 14, No.1; Jan 2018: p.127–147 |
| Journal Source | Foreign Policy Analysis 2018-03 14, 1 |
| Key Words | Arms Control Agreements ; Institutional Design |