| ID | 158978 |
| Title Proper | Command coordination and tactical effectiveness in counter-insurgency operations |
| Other Title Information | Lessons from the South Korean campaign |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Park, Soul ; Paik, Seung Joon |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article analyzes the causes of combat effectiveness of the South Korean security forces through the course of its various counter-insurgency (COIN) operations from 1948 to 1953. We argue that improvements in two interrelated aspects ultimately resulted in higher operational and tactical level performance: unified operational command structure and the subsequent improvements in tactical efficiency under the guidance of the US advisory mission. Through an in-depth case study on how a nascent army improved its capacity in combating homegrown insurgencies, we demonstrate how the actual conduct of operations itself remains just as significant in the assessment of overall COIN outcomes. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 29, No.2; Apr 2018: p.291-315 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol: 29 No 2 |
| Key Words | Indigenous Forces ; Tactical Effectiveness ; Counterinsurgency (COIN) ; Interagency Cooperation and Coordination ; Korean Constabulary (KC) ; Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) ; Korean National Police (KNP) |