| ID | 158980 |
| Title Proper | Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Selber, Major William |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs. |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 29, No.2; Apr 2018: p. 344-366 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol: 29 No 2 |
| Key Words | Disarmament ; Counterinsurgency ; Reintegration ; Demobilization ; United Nations Development Programme ; Afghan New Beginnings Program ; Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups ; Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program ; Stathis Kalyvas ; The Logic of Violence in Civil War |