| ID | 158995 |
| Title Proper | Nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation among Soviet allies |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lanoszka, Alexander |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Most alliance-related explanations of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation draw from US security relationships. Yet, the Soviet Union, too, exhibited variation in proliferation tendencies within its own system of alliances. Only one Warsaw Pact member—Romania—was interested in seeking nuclear weapons, whereas both of its East Asian allies—China and North Korea—pursued nuclear weapons. What explains this pattern of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation among Soviet allies? I draw on deterrence theory to argue that the same logic that some scholars invoke to explain nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation among US allies can also shed light on patterns of proliferation and nonproliferation among Soviet allies; the quality of Soviet security guarantees varied across recipients in East Central Europe and East Asia, and this variation accounts for subsequent differences in levels of nuclear interest shown by Soviet allies. My claims challenge accounts that the United States and Soviet Union colluded to manage proliferation risks, as well as arguments that democratic states have unique advantages in making credible security guarantees. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Global security Studies Vol. 3, No.2; Apr 2018: p.217–233, |
| Journal Source | Journal of Global security Studies Vol: 3 No 2 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; Warsaw Pact ; Nuclear Proliferation ; Alliances |