| ID | 159086 |
| Title Proper | Posture versus presence |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Rubel, Robert C |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | There has occurred of late a controversy of sorts regarding the vector of
investment by the U.S. Navy. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter overruled
certain aspects of the Navy’s fiscal year 2016 budget, directing funds away from
presence-related items such as the littoral combat ship (LCS) and toward highend
combat capabilities such as the F-35.1
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
Admiral John Richardson categorized the ensuing debate about the functions of
presence versus high-end military posture as a “false choice,” asserting that the
Navy must provide both in a balanced manner.2
However, in an era of budget
squeezes, marginal trade-offs meant to solve the problem, such as Carter’s Navy
budget alterations, could result in a Navy that will be able to provide neither to
a sufficient degree. Decisions on “fleet design” should be informed by an understanding
of the relationship between forward engagement, in all its forms, and
combat posture.3
Regarding these two functional elements of the Navy’s mission
as either mutually exclusive or having a primary/collateral relationship is a recipe
for strategic error. |
| `In' analytical Note | Naval War College Review Vol. 69, No.4; Autumn 2016: p.19-29 |
| Journal Source | Naval War College Review Vol: 69 No 4 |
| Key Words | Global Naval Engagement ; Naval War-Fighting Posture |