| ID | 159434 |
| Title Proper | Damn Hard Job |
| Other Title Information | James A. Van Fleet and the Combat Effectiveness of U.S. Army Infantry, July 1951–February 1953 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Donnelly, William M ; William M. Donnelly |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | James A. Van Fleet believed that units possessing the will to win would always emerge victorious from any battle. From July 1951 to the end of his tenure as Eighth Army’s commander in Korea in February 1953, he would find that his mission of holding the line until an armistice made it difficult to maintain a will to win among U.S. Army infantrymen. Also working against him were factors arising from the Army’s manpower crisis and the tactical problems facing his infantrymen on the battlefield. Under these conditions Van Fleet was unable to keep these units “fit, ready, and eager to fight.” |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Military History Vol. 82, No.1; Jan 2018: p.147-179 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Military History 2018-03 82, 1 |
| Key Words | Combat Effectiveness ; Damn Hard Job ; Van Fleet ; U.S. Army Infantry |