| ID | 159441 |
| Title Proper | Crossing Challenge |
| Other Title Information | the Suez Canal Crossing by the Israel Defense Forces during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ezov, Amiram |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The crossing of the Suez Canal by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 encompassed the toughest and bloodiest battles that the IDF had ever known. Because of the characteristics of the forces and missions involved, it was the ultimate expression of a multi-dimensional battle. During the campaign, there were battles to achieve breakthrough and approach clearing, armor versus armor battles, water obstacle crossings, bridging, establishment of a bridgehead, all featuring complicated logistics. Most of the branches of the IDF became involved and a full range of combat apparatus was deployed, including some items which had not been fully developed and on which training had not been suitably completed. The central problem of the crossing campaign was the “orchestration” of new fighting materials—the means to achieve a water crossing—into a battle that had not been foreseen. Alongside organization, fighting doctrine, and training, this kind of orchestration also demanded innovative leadership and command and control, effective communications, and the ability to cope with a complex and unexpected battlefield. The aim of this article is to test and compare the objectives, planning, and execution of two crossing campaigns—that of the Egyptian Army and that of the IDF. The differences in doctrine stemmed from the choice of strategic objectives and from the adoption of differing combat doctrines. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Military History Vol. 82, No.2; Apr 2018: p.461-90 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Military History 2018-06 82, 2 |
| Key Words | Yom Kippur War ; Israel Defense Forces ; Crossing Challenge ; Suez Canal Crossing |