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ID159757
Title ProperInfluence of Incumbency and Partisanship on Fenno’s Paradox
Other Title Informationevidence from Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan
LanguageENG
AuthorRich, Timothy S ;  Timothy S Rich
Summary / Abstract (Note)Fenno’s Paradox—the preference for one’s own legislator while disliking the legislature as a whole—remains one of the most consistent findings in American politics. This tendency increases the likelihood for incumbents to win reelection, despite being a part of a less popular institution. Little analysis looks at whether Fenno’s Paradox exists outside of the US in other legislative contexts, or whether incumbency itself or partisan identification is the larger influence. Using 2012 survey data from Taiwan, a mixed member system, this analysis examines individual level divergence between preference for a legislator and institutional preference. Consistent with work in American politics, we find a marginal incumbency advantage, but this effect is attenuated by the partisanship of the district legislator.
`In' analytical NoteJournal of Asian and African Studies Vol. 53, No.4; Jun 2018: p.497-510
Journal SourceJournal of Asian and African Studies 2018-07 53, 4
Key WordsTaiwan ;  Partisanship ;  Incumbency ;  Fenno’s Paradox