| ID | 160006 |
| Title Proper | Limits of market power in shaping international regulatory cooperation |
| Other Title Information | path dependence and loss avoidance in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Corning, Gregory P |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What factors shape the ability of the United States to negotiate international regulatory cooperation? This paper discusses three theoretical approaches that help to explain the potential for regulatory change – market power, historical institutionalism, and loss avoidance – and applies them to the negotiation of regulatory issues in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). It seeks to understand why the regulatory disciplines in some TPP chapters were more rigorous than those in other chapters. Focusing on case-studies of the chapters on state-owned enterprises and regulatory coherence, the paper argues that the market power of the United States is more likely to secure stronger regulatory disciplines when there is: (1) a strong loss avoidance coalition in the USA pushing for change, and (2) a weakly institutionalized regulatory framework among parties in a given issue area that makes path dependence less important. |
| `In' analytical Note | Pacific Review Vol. 31, No.1; Jan 2018: p.1-19 |
| Journal Source | Pacific Review Vol: 31 No 1 |
| Key Words | Path Dependence ; State-Owned Enterprise ; Trans-Pacific Partnership ; International Regulatory Cooperation ; Loss Avoidance |