| ID | 160027 |
| Title Proper | Principles of Minimum Force and the Parachute Regiment in Northern Ireland, 1969–1972 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Sanders, Andrew |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Developing literature on Operation Banner, the codename for the British military operation in Northern Ireland, has indicated that the conduct of soldiers deployed was not always in line with principles of minimum force. Adherence to these principles would seem to have been essential to the success of the operation given the initial deployment of the soldiers was in the role of military aid to the civil power. This article will examine the role of one of the British Army’s most aggressive units, the Parachute Regiment, and will show how the responses of the regiment to the demands of the operation in Northern Ireland were frequently in contravention of minimum force principles. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 41, No.5; Aug 2018: p.659-683 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 41 No 5 |
| Key Words | Northern Ireland ; Minimum Force ; Parachute Regiment ; Terrorism, Counterinsurgency |