| ID | 160350 |
| Title Proper | Who Restrains Who? |
| Other Title Information | Sino-DPRK Strategic Interaction During the Second Nuclear Crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Song Wenzhi and Son Daekwon ; Wenzhi, Song ; Daekwon, Son |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper seeks to find an answer to the question of why China’s effort to curb
North Korea’s nuclear development has failed to produce expected outcomes.
Since the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, China, as the most, if not
sole, influential country to North Korea, has been attempting to restrain the North’s
nuclear armament. Nevertheless, Beijing has always failed to sustain its pressure
on Pyongyang long enough to restrain Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition; instead, it
has often ended up with China’s appeasement policy. Witnessing such failure, some
scholars assert that Beijing is able, but not willing, to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear
armament, while others claim that Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang is a lot
more limited than widely thought. Yet, both schools of thought, focusing narrowly
on China’s capability or willingness to restrain North Korea, has failed to depict
a full picture. By contrast, this study, employing a game theory approach, views
Sino–DPRK relations as a strategic interaction between restrainer and restrainee.
It argues that North Korea’s tactical deception and military adventurism shuffle
China’s political priorities on the Korean peninsula, thereby preventing China from
pressuring North Korea. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 30, No.2; Jun 2018: p.231－246
|
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 30 No 2 |
| Key Words | China ; North Korea ; Restraint ; Appeasement ; The Second Nuclear Crisis |