| ID | 160574 |
| Title Proper | Political relations, leader stability, and economic coercion |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Mclean, Elena V ; Elena V McLean Mitchell T Radtke ; Radtke, Mitchell T |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Countries use economic sanctions as a way to force their opponents to make policy concessions. Such external pressure may, as the designers of sanctions often intend, affect the degree of domestic support for the target's political leaders. It may even threaten the leaders’ survival in office. We investigate how these dual pressures—preference for policy concessions and concern about target leaders’ political future—shape the use of sanctions in the context of political relations between the sanctioning and sanctioned countries. The political relations between the two countries matter because a decline in the likelihood of the target leader's political survival results in a cost for the sanctioner when the target is a friendly regime and generates a benefit when the targeted regime is an adversary. Therefore, we argue, and show statistically, that economic coercion is more likely for friendly governments when they are politically stable and unfriendly governments when they are politically vulnerable. We illustrate our causal mechanism using declassified primary sources for two case studies of US sanctions against Chile. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 62, No.2; Jun 2018: p.357–370 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 62 No 2 |
| Key Words | Political Relations ; Economic Coercion ; Leader Stability |