| ID | 161360 |
| Title Proper | Failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions |
| Other Title Information | ascertaining causation and determining solutions |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Young, Thomas-Durell |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 41, No.7; Dec 2018: p.1031-1057 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 41 No 7 |
| Key Words | Planning ; Budgeting ; Post-Communism ; Defense Planning ; Programming ; Central/Eastern Europe ; Execution (System PBPS) |