| ID | 161549 |
| Title Proper | Repressing for reputation |
| Other Title Information | leadership transitions, uncertainty, and the repression of domestic populations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Licht, Amanda A |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | When do leaders use repression? Leadership transitions disrupt the relationship between regime and citizens, introducing uncertainty about whether the state will use force to put down dissent. This shock to the equilibrium level of repression and dissent threatens the survival of new leaders by inviting challenges, incentivizing them to build a deterrent reputation. Investing in repression early allows a rapid re-equilibration, leading to a decrease in the probability of increased repression as a leader gains experience in office. Some leaders, therefore, have a reason to put down dissent early in their tenure to clearly establish a reputation for toughness, one that exists distinct from that of the state or the regime. These dynamics surface only for leaders that break with the prior regime. Those closely linked to the existing order can draw upon an established reputation and need not develop their own. Statistical analyses of changes in repression intensity from 1990 to 2005 reveal strong support for the argument. Breaks with the prior regime produce a short-term increase in repression, but leaders who come to power via such transitions become less likely to change the level of coercion the longer they remain in office. Leaders tied directly to the prior administration exhibit neither tendency. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Peace Research Vol. 55, No.5; Sep 2018: p.582-595 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Peace Research Vol: 55 No 5 |
| Key Words | Leaders ; Repression ; Reputation |