| ID | 161599 |
| Title Proper | Even constrained governments take |
| Other Title Information | the domestic politics of transfer and expropriation risks |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Graham, Benjamin A T |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal model to derive testable implications regarding the effect of political institutions and domestic politics on governments’ ability to collect these two types of rent. Empirically, we use novel time-series cross-sectional data to show that while veto-player-type political constraints diminish expropriation risk, transfer risk is much less affected: even constrained governments impose transfer restrictions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 62, No.8; Sep 2018: p.1784-1813 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 62 No 8 |
| Key Words | Political Economy ; Investment ; FDI ; Game Theory ; Political Risk |