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ID161961
Title ProperStrategies of Repression
Other Title InformationJudicial and Extrajudicial Methods of Autocratic Survival
LanguageENG
AuthorShen-Bayh, Fiona
Summary / Abstract (Note)Strategies of repression vary widely between extrajudicial and judicial extremes, from unrestrained acts of violence to highly routinized legal procedures. While the former have received a great deal of scholarly attention, judicial methods remain relatively understudied. When and why do rulers repress their rivals in court? The author argues that autocrats use a judicial strategy of repression when confronting challengers from within the ruling elite. Unlike regime outsiders, who pose a common, external threat to mobilize against, insiders present a more divisive target. When autocrats confront the latter, a judicial strategy legitimizes punishment, deters future rivals, and generates shared beliefs regarding incumbent strength and challenger weakness. Using original data on political prisoners in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, the author finds that autocrats were significantly more likely to use a judicial strategy against insiders and an extrajudicial strategy against outsiders. A case study of Kenya traces the logic of the theory, showing how intraregime conflict made courts a valuable instrument of state repression. The findings demonstrate how courts can play a central role in autocratic survival.
`In' analytical NoteWorld Politics Vol. 70, No.3; Jul 2018: p.321-357
Journal SourceWorld Politics 2018-06 70, 3
Key WordsAutocratic Survival ;  Strategies of Repression ;  Judicial and Extrajudicial Methods