| ID | 162213 |
| Title Proper | Primaries and candidate polarization |
| Other Title Information | behavioral theory and experimental evidence |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Woon, Jonathan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Do primary elections cause candidates to take extreme, polarized positions? Standard equilibrium analysis predicts full convergence to the median voter’s position with complete information, but behavioral game theory predicts divergence when players are policy-motivated and have out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Theoretically, I show that primary elections can cause greater extremism or moderation, depending on the beliefs candidates and voters have about their opponents. In a controlled incentivized experiment, I find that candidates diverge substantially and that primaries have little effect on average positions. Voters employ a strategy that weeds out candidates who are either too moderate or too extreme, which enhances ideological purity without increasing divergence. The analysis highlights the importance of behavioral assumptions in understanding the effects of electoral institutions. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 112, No.4; Nov 2018: p.826-843 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2018-10 112, 4 |
| Key Words | Experimental Evidence ; Behavioral Theory ; Candidate Polarizatio |