| ID | 162246 |
| Title Proper | Territorial Conflict: Trade-offs and Strategies |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Keskin, Kerim |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm, which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward of winning). This paper highlights the effects of this trade-off on the equilibrium strategies of the warring states in a contest game with endogenous rewards. Providing both static and dynamic models, our analysis captures insights regarding strategic behavior in asymmetric contests with such conflict. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 29, No.6; Nov 2018: p.658-665 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 29 No 6 |
| Key Words | War ; Territorial Conflict ; Contest ; Endogenous Reward |