| ID | 162680 |
| Title Proper | Limiting cyberwarfare |
| Other Title Information | applying arms-control models to an emerging technology |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Dumbacher, Erin D |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | An arms race in cyberspace is underway. US and Western government efforts to control this process have largely been limited to deterrence and norm development. This article examines an alternative policy option: arms control. To gauge whether arms-control models offer useful lessons for addressing cyber capabilities, this article compiles a new dataset of predominantly twentieth-century arms-control agreements. It also evaluates two case studies of negotiated agreements that regulate dual-use technologies, the 1928 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical- and biological-weapon use and the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. The analysis underscores the limits of norm development for emerging technologies with both civilian and military applications. It finds lessons for developing verifiable, international cooperation mechanisms for cyberwarfare in the regulatory model of international aviation. Conventionally, arms-control agreements take advantage of transparent tests or estimates of arms. To restrict cyberwarfare activities, experts and policy makers must adapt arms-control models to a difficult-to-measure technology at an advanced stage of development and use. Further investigation of international regulatory schemes for dual-use technology of similar diffusion and development to the internet, such as international civil aviation, is needed. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 25, No.3-4; Jun-Jul 2018: p.203-222 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol: 25 No 3-4 |
| Key Words | Arms Control ; Chemical weapons convention ; Verification ; Biological weapons convention ; Cyberwarfare ; Norms ; Dual Use ; Civil Aviation ; Cyberweapons ; Geneva Protocol |