| ID | 163235 |
| Title Proper | Reformers and the rentiersState |
| Other Title Information | re evaluating the co-optation mechanism in rentier state theory |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Moritz, Jessie |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The oil and gas-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have long been treated as exceptional, where distributions of rent-based wealth to society assumedly preclude political dissent. Yet, by examining informal and formal opposition in Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman since 2011, this article disputes the effectiveness of this “co-optation mechanism” at the sub-national level. Drawing from 135 semi-structured interviews conducted with citizens of these states, it uncovers evidence of challenges to state authority even among nationals who should theoretically be co-opted. In examining the limits of rent-based co-optation, the article highlights two key political dynamics that have demonstrated a capacity to overpower rent-based incentives to remain politically inactive: ideology and repression. Societies, then, were far from quiescent, and this research examines the networks and dynamics that have allowed citizens to challenge state authority. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Arabian Studies vol. 8,S1; Sep-2018; p46-64 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Arabian Studies Vol: 8 No 1 Supp |
| Key Words | Political Economy ; Oil ; Ideology ; Bahrain ; Oman ; Qatar ; Repression ; Resource Curse ; Co-optation ; Rentier State Theory |