| ID | 163574 |
| Title Proper | Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict |
| Other Title Information | a coup-proofing paradox |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Powell, Jonathan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being plagued with rebellion. Scholarship has argued the practice of coup-proofing is potentially responsible for this trend. However, though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, states often retain substantial capabilities in the form of well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing units. This article argues that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are hesitant to deploy their coup-proofing units: when coup risk is high. Using a global sample of authoritarian regimes for the years 1971–2011, tests indicate that heavily coup-proofed regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high but see no change in conflict propensity when coup risk is low. |
| `In' analytical Note | Armed Forces and Society Vol. 45, No.1; Jan 2019: p.27-44 |
| Journal Source | Armed Forces and Society Vol: 45 No 1 |
| Key Words | Civil Wars ; Military Effectiveness ; Civil–Military Relations ; Coup-Proofing ; Coups and Conflicts |