| ID | 163810 |
| Title Proper | India's Counterforce Temptations |
| Other Title Information | Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Clary, Christopher ; Narang, Vipin ; Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Security Vol. 43, No.3; Winter 2019: p.7-52 |
| Journal Source | International Security Vol: 43 No 3 |
| Key Words | Doctrine ; Capabilities ; Strategic Dilemmas ; India's Counterforce Temptations ; Nuclear counterforce strategy |