| ID | 164662 |
| Title Proper | Tilting at windmills |
| Other Title Information | the flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Clary, Christopher |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 42, No.5; Aug 2019: p.677-700 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 42 No 5 |
| Key Words | India ; Bangladesh ; Pakistan ; Kissinger ; Biafra ; Sino - U.S. Relations ; Nixo ; 1971 India-Pakistan War ; Motivated Biases ; Availability Heuristic |